BYU Law Review
Volume 1979 | Issue 1

Article 6

3-1-1979

Refining the Traditional Theories of Recovery for
Consumer Mental Anguish
Val John Christensen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Val John Christensen, Refining the Traditional Theories of Recovery for Consumer Mental Anguish, 1979 BYU L. Rev. 81 (1979).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1979/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

COMMENTS
Refining the Traditional Theories of Recovery for
Consumer Mental Anguish
Emotional distress naturally results from offensive, abusive,
or otherwise dissatisfactory consumer transactions, yet the law
has been reluctant to redress emotional injuries caused by offensive business practices.l In almost all cases a finding of extreme
and outrageous conduct is required before recovery is granted.2
Only in cases involving common carriers, innkeepers, and other
public utilities, which have become uniquely liable for the insults
and indignities of their employees, does the law grant recovery for
offensive conduct short of extreme ~ u t r a g eIf. ~the words or conduct of a private business are not extreme and outrageous, some
legal scholars have queried whether a cause of action should nevertheless be recognized based on an extension of the liability imposed on public ~ t i l i t i e s . ~
This Comment will discuss briefly the roles of tort and contract in consumer mental anguish recovery, and then examine in
greater detail the historical and economic rationale for imposing
liability on public utilities for the insults and indignities of their
employees. The Comment will then examine recent decisions that
allow consumer recovery for emotional distress on the basis of
traditional common law notions of. liability. Finally, a proposal
for a new framework of consumer recovery will be made.
1. Stavnezer v. Sage-Allen& Co., 146 Conn. 460,152 A.2d 312 (1959);Slocum v. Food
Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958); Name v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517,
150 P.2d 773 (1944). See Borda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28
GEO. L.J. 55 (1939). In recent times the judiciary has shown a greater willingness to
recognize emotional interests as legally protectable, but recovery is still limited by strict
review of the facts in each case, taking into consideration the foreseeability of harm to
the emotions, the unreasonableness of the actor's conduct, and the gravity of distress. Id.
a t 56-57.
2. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS4 46, Comment d (1965).
3. See Prmer, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF.
L. REV.40, 59-63 (1956). Recovery is
limited to cases where the conduct of the defendant, "although falling short of extreme
outrage, still rises above the level of petty and trivial offensiveness." Id. a t 63.
4. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HAW.L.
REV.1033, 1052 (1936); Prosser, supra note 3, at 63; Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and
Insulting Language, 4 VAND.L. REV.63, 69-70 (1950).
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Historically, two theoretical foundations permit a purchaser
to recover damages for emotional distress arising from a consumer
transaction.) The purchaser can base his recovery for mental suffering on either breach of contract%r traditional tort t h e ~ r y . ~
When relying on contract remedies, a purchaser-plaintiff
must overcome the general rule denying damages for mental anguish resulting from breach of contract by successfully applying
one of the following exceptions. First, sufficient proof that the
defendant's conduct in breaching the contract was reckless, willful, or malicious permits compensatory damages that may serve
.~
if the contract implies or exa punitive p ~ r p o s eAlternatively,
presses a duty on the part of the seller to tender the goods or
services in a civil and decent manner, a showing of willful and
reckless behavior establishes a breach of contract that would warrant recovery of compensatory damages.' The plaintiff need only
prove that the resulting mental anguish was within the contemplation of both parties at the inception of the contract. The most
recognized exception is applied upon a determination that the
basis of the contract is emotional rather than pecuniary.1° "Where
other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for, damages have
been allowed for injury to the feelings."ll
Some courts have adhered to the general rule denying recovery for mental anguish for breach of contract but have nevertheless allowed recovery by finding a tortious breach of a legal duty
stemming from the contractual relationship." Although tort and
5. Both contract and tort theories apply naturally to the factual circumstances surrounding a consumer transaction. The consumer expends his resources in exchange for
goods o;services and expects a commitment from the business to act honestly and fairly.
A breach of the seller's duty to avoid outrageous conduct constitutes an actionable tort,
while a breach of a similar duty contemplated by buyer and seller as a substantial element
of the contract results in an actionable breach of contract. Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket
Co., 438 F. Supp. 906 (D. Mont. 1977). See, e.g., Seidenbach's, Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d
185, 191 (Okla. 1961) (Berry, J., dissenting).
6. E.g., Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970).
7. E.g., World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1975).
8. See Jankowski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich. App. 483, 152 N.W.2d 49 (1967); Comment,
Remedies- "Extra-Contractual" Remedies for Breach of Contract in North Carolina, 55
N.C.L. REV.1125, 1149-50 (1977).
9. WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS
8 1341, a t 221 (3d ed. 1968)--.
- .10. See Cohen v. Varig Airlines, S.A., 85 Misc. 26 653, 662, 380 N.Y.S.2d 450, 461
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975).
11. WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS
8 1341, at 214 (3d ed. 1968).
12. Lowery v. Kansas City, 337 Mo. 47, 85 S.W.2d 104 (1935); Driekosen v. Black,
Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 158 Neb. 531, 64 N.W.2d 88 (1954).
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contract actions are distinct and independent,13most courts fail
to identify the source of the duty breached, blurring the line
between tort and contract.14 One critic has argued that the distinction between tort and contract is a nonissue, since a plaintiff
should be allowed "to have the issues of fact determined in his
favor, if the evidence is there, irrespective of the question whether
a breach of contract or a tort has oc~urred?~This notion accurately reflects the recent trend that allows more frequent recovery
for nervous shock. Between tort and contract, a "gradual equalising, or fusing process . . is taking place."lVI'his simplified approach depends on an implicit legal duty to exercise civility and
decency in contractual as well as noncontractual business transactions.l7

.

A. Origins of the Distinction
In earlier centuries, all persons engaged in particular trades
or common callings were held to a duty of care in rendering their
services, while others who rendered the same services on an occasional basis were held to no such duty.18This early distinction was
justified because those persons engaged in the occupation of performing specific services, by holding themselves out as
"common" businessmen such as "common carriers," "common
farriers," and "common innkeepers," assumed the risk of compensating those who relied on their public representations of competence in practicing their particular trades? "Common" busi13. See Otto v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 277 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1960).
14. See Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 483 P.2d 664 (1971); Busch v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co., 187 N.Y.388, 80 N.E.197 (1907); Fridman, The Interactions of Tort
and Contract, 93 LAW Q. REV. 422, 422-23 (1977).
15. F'ridman, supra note 14, at 432.
The defendant could still plead whatever defences he can legitimately raise to
a claim in tort or contract: but he could no longer dictate to the plaintiff the
kind of claim which the latter may bring, and then prevent the plaintiff from
achieving the success which should be his, on the merits of the case.
Id. at 436.
16. Id. at 440.
17. "[A]ccompanying every contract, there is a common law duty to perform with
care . . and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, [the breach of which] is a tort, as
well as a breach of contract." 74 AM. JUR. Torts 8 24 (1974) (footnote omitted).
18. Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U . PA. L. REV. 411,
412-16 (1927).
19. "[Alnyone who held himself out to serve all who might apply was conceived of
as assuming a public or common calling, and by force of this assumpsit was held to

.
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nesses had a duty to practice their trades on demand and to
exercise skill in performan~e.~~
Those who performed services on
a casual, one-time basis did so at the risk of the hirer, and any
injury suffered by the hirer as a result of the worker's negligence,
lack of skill, or impropriety was suffered without remedy.21
It would seem that the origin arid basis of the liability of the
person engaged in a common calling for failure to serve, or for
lack of care in the performance of the service, is to be found in
this early developed branch of the action on the case. It was
because a person held himself out to serve the public generally,
making that his business, and in doing so assumed to serve all
members of the public who should apply, and to serve them with
care, that he was liable . . for lack of care in the performance
of the service.22

.

The devastating destruction of human capital resulting from
the Black Death in the fourteenth century left England with a
serious shortage of laborers. As a result, tradesmen charged any
price they pleased and often refused to serve in order to increase
the price of their services. The Statutes of Laborers were passed
to cope with this problem by forcing tradesmen to accept all
requests for services and preventing them from charging unreasonable rates? The public's demand for laborers generated a
public interest in regulating "common" callings, and correlative
legislative activity brought stringent regulations and tighter policy controls.24
Fourteenth-century England also saw its population clustered in small communities separated from each other by treacherous, unimproved highways." Travel was dangerous for the illequipped or inexperienced. Outlaws roamed the countryside and
night travel was avoided. Consequently, common carriers and
innkeepers occupied positions as virtual monop~lies.~~
The comobligate himself to serve all who should apply and to serve with care." Burdick, The Origin
of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (pt. I), 11 COLUM.L. REV. 514, 522
PUBLIC
SERVICE
CORPORATIONS
§ 201 (1911); Arterburn, supra note
(1911). See 1 B. WYMAN,
18, at 415.
20. Arterburn, supra note 18, at 413.
21. Id. at 416.
22. Burdick, supra note 19, at 515-16.
23. Arterburn, supra note 18, at 421-22.
supra note 19, 8 17.
24. 1 B. WYMAN,
25. Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17
HARV.L. REV. 156, 160 (1904).
26. Id. Private businesses, on the other hand, competed for customers in the marketplace and were regulated by the economic forces of free enterprise. A customer in town
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mon carriers represented the only safe means of travel, and the
inn was the only safe place to stay. Because society was particularly interested in having suitable accommodations available for
the traveling public,27the public's role in regulating common carriers and innkeepers was established?
The unique liabilities imposed on common carriers, innkeepers, and other public' utilities can therefore be traced to two
factors present in the fourteenth century: (1)the development of
a general public policy requiring common callings to serve their
customers with care and (2) the existence of monopolistic characteristics among particular businesses, which necessitated public
control through legislative and judicial action.2gIn the centuries
that followed, economic conditions improved and the majority of
trades known as common callings were dropped from that classification." However, because of their monopoly position in the market, common carriers, innkeepers, and other inherently public
businesses continued to be regulated by public interests and remained the only businesses subject to the peculiar duty to serve
all who sought their services.31These public service businesses
have since become subject to other unique liabilities, such as for
emotional suffering caused by the gross insults and indignities of
their employees,32while private businesses have been left to the
could go from shop to shop, having time to choose and a broad selection to choose from.
If treated unsatisfactorily, he could leave the shop and go to the next one. Id. a t 159.
supra note 19, $9 12, 13.
27. 1 B. WYMAN,
28. "The essential thing in all this is the recognition of the common calling as a thing
apart from the private calling, presenting different conditions, involving the necessity
therefore of further law than that which suffices to regulate ,ordinary businesses." Wyman,
supra note 25, at 160-61.
29. "This extreme form of the police power over public employment remained in the
legislative branch notwithstanding the general guaranties of individual liberty contained
supra note 19, Q 19. See Arterburn, supra
in the American constitutions." 1 B. WYMAN,
note 18, a t 423. The courts regularly enforced the common law duty to serve all who
applied for services and to exercise skill and care in performance. Wyman, supra note 25,
at 158-59.
30. Arterburn, supra note 18, a t 427.
31. "Barber, surgeon, smith and tailor are no longer in common calling because the
situation in the modem times does not require it; but innkeeper, carrier, ferryman and
supra note 19, 9 20.
wharfinger are still in that classification." 1 B. WYMAN,
[A]s a result of the rapidly changing economic conditions it soon became more
and more usual for persons to hold themselves out to serve the public generally
in all lines of commercial activity, . . . and the assumpsit, so important in
earlier actions on the case, and implied in the case of one engaged in a common
calling from the holding-out, was no longer recognized as a necessary element.
Burdick, supra note 19, at 522-23. See Wyman, supra note 25, a t 158-61.
OF TORTS
9 48 (1965).
32. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
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operative restraints of the competitive market systemY

B. Common Carriers, Innkeepers, and Other Public Utilities: A
Higher Standard of Conduct
Section 48 of the Restatement of Torts summarizes the legal
duty imposed on common carriers, innkeepers, and other public
utilities to protect a customer's interest in freedom from insulting
or abusive conduct." The law requires a higher duty of care of
these businesses in dealing with patrons, and consequently, offensive words or conduct short of extreme outrage are actionable."
Common carriers were the first to feel the sting of money
judgments awarded to patrons suffering from the emotional abuse
of careless or reckless employees. Recovery was initially based on
an implied contract to carry passengers both safely and in a decent and civil manner.36From this notion evolved the current
legal duty imposed upon all public utilities to serve the public
with politeness and respect."
For example, in Brown v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc."
the plaintiff successfully recovered damages for the "indignity,
humiliation and nervous strain caused by the insulting and abusive language" of a bus driver who refused to stop at the plaintiffs
request.3eThe court reasoned that "in an age when psychiatry has
shown the profound and disastrous effects of mental anguish,
33. "The processes of competition may be trusted in the case of the shop, they do
not act with any certainty in the case of the inn." Wyman, supra note 25, at 159 (footnote
omitted).
Had the courts in the foqteenth century (when all businesses were common callings)
been disposed to recognize a duty to refrain from offensive and insulting business practices
as part of the duty to perform services in a competent manner, the liability for abusive
conduct causing emotional distress would likely have been imposed on all businesses
professing competence in a particular trade. Liability would have been avoided only by
those who engaged in a particular service on an infrequent, casual basis, where the employer hired such persons at his own risk. Yet, most tradesmen had been dropped from
the "public calling" category by the time the duty to refrain h m abusive business practices likely to cause emotional distress had been imposed on public utilities. The obligation of courtesy was generally recognized in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
Prosser, s u m note 3, at 59 & n.113, while the exclusion of mpst tradesmen from the public
calling category was evident in the fifteenth century, Arterbum, supra note 18, at 426.
OF TORTS4 48 (1965).
34. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
35. "It is only where there is a special relation between the parties, as stated in § 48,
that there may be recovery for insults not amounting to extreme outrage." R~~TATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS4 46, Comment d (1965).
36. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF.L. REV.40, 59 (1956).
OF TORTSQ
37. The action is now "essentially one in tort." ~ A T E M E N T(SECOND)
48, Comment a (1965).
38. 16 Misc. 2d 692, 185 N.Y.S.2d 923 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1959).
39. Id. at 694, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
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even in the absence of apparent physical injury," a refusal to
allow recovery for mental anguish would be untenablee40
The court reasoned that enforcement of the carrier's obligation to exercise a high degree of responsibility requires the carrier
to choose its employees with care.41It argued that the economic
pressure resulting from penalties imposed by the court would
encourage the replacement of reckless and offensive employees.
The common carrier is "entrusted [with} the lives and limbs and
comfort and convenience of the whole traveling public, and it is
certainly as important that these servants should be trustworthy
as it is that they should be ~ o m p e t e n t . " ~ ~
This higher duty has also been imposed on those offering
lodging to the public.43Innkeepers occupy a position analogous to
common carriers and are subject to the same high standard of
care in dealing with their customers.44In Boyce u. Greeley Square
Hotel C O .an
~ ~employee of the defendant-hotel forcibly entered
the plaintiff's room and charged her and her husband with
immoral conduct. In allowing recovery for the plaintiff's mental
suffering, the court held that the general rule denying such recovery does not apply in cases involving innkeepers since they must
treat guests civilly and avoid words or conduct that might cause
emotional distress.46
The failure of telegraph companies to deliver messages
promptly or accurately has often injured the emotions of senders
and receivers. Recovery for emotional distress has been based on
the commonsense conclusion that persons patronizing telegraph
companies attach great importance to instant communication
with others.'' This is especially true in the transmission of messages concerning illness or death.48To recover, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant was aware of a blood relationship between the communicating parties or some other special circumstance making mental anguish a probable result of failure to
40. Id.
41. Id. at 695, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
& F. JAMES,THELAW OF TORTS$ 9.3 (1965) (quoting Goddard v.
42. 1 F. HARPER
Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 213 (1869)).
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
$ 48, Comment a (1965).
43. RESTATEMENT
44. Emmke v. De Silva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); Prosser, supra note 36, at 60. See
1 B. WYMAN,
supra note 19, 8 12.
45. 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920).
46. Id. at 190, 126 N.E. at 649.
47. 29 NEB.L. REV.481, 483 (1952). See also 22 TEX.L. REV.106, 106 (1943).
48. 29 NEB.L. REV. 481, 482 (1952).
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promptly deliver the message." In many circumstances the nature of services performed by telegraph companies necessarily
heightens a customer's interest in mental security.5oStuart u.
Western Union Telegraph CO." is a leading case allowing damages for mental anguish resulting from a delayed telegraph message. Because of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff received
word of his brother's illness too late to comfort him, see him
before his death, or even attend his funeral. The court awarded
the plaintiff compensatory damages. Defending the award
against a motion for rehearing, the court declared that "physical
pain is no more real than is mental anguish."52
Mental anguish suits arising from telegraphic communications have largely disappeared because of decreased use of telegraphy as the chief means of emergency communication. It is helpful, however, to understand the rationale for recovery in telegraph
cases. Telegraph companies held themselves out as the chief and
perhaps only means of communicating immediately with others.
Consequently, they had a unique capacity to wound the emotions
of those who relied on their representation of prompt and accurate service. Businesses maintaining a comparable position of
power to wound patrons' feelings should arguably be subject to
the same high standard of conscientious conduct.
C. Private Businesses
While common carriers, innkeepers, and other public utilities can be held liable for gross insults and indignities, a private
business' conduct must be extreme and outrageous before recovery will be granted to an injured consumer.53"It has not been
enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized
by 'malice.' "54 The conduct must be "so outrageous in character,
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
49. Id. at 482.
50. Id.
51. 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W.351 (1885).
.--52. Id. at 587, 18 S.W. at 354.
53. "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and
if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." ~ T A T E M E N T(SECOND)
OF TORTS
8 46 (1965).
54. Id. 5 46,Comment d.
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in a civilized ~ommunity."~~
The "insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities" confronted in everyday life are clearly
not contemplated by the term "outrageous conduct." There is a
need for freedom of expression "and some safety valve must be
left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam."" Only where there is a special relationship between the parties, as set forth in section 48 of the Restatement of
Torts, is recovery allowed for insults or indignities not amounting
to extreme outrage.57

A. An Economic Foundation
Economic conditions in earlier centuries may have had the
strongest influence on the development of the public utility status
and its accompanying unique liabilities." Monopoly thus emerges
as the principal factor for assigning common carriers, innkeepers,
and other public utilities a stricter liability for the emotional
suffering caused by offensive employees. Unlike most private
businesses, whose competitive success depends on satisfied customers, noncompetitive public utilities can afford to be largely
indifferent to the emotional welfare of their patrons.
The public interest in regulating monopolies such as common carriers and innkeepers set the stage in the late nineteenth
century for the imposition of liability for emotional abuse. In
Chamberlain v. Chandlers5@
Justice Story held that the captain
of an oceangoing common carrier was not only responsible for the
passengers' safety and quarters on the ship, but that he was also
under a duty to provide comforts, necessities, and kindness.'O The
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. "A common carrier or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons
utilizing its facilities for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the
utility's servants while otherwise acting within the scope of their employment."
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF TORTSQ 48 (1965).
58. The difference between public and private callings has been described as
a distinction in the law governing business relations which has always had and
will always have most important consequences. . . . The causes of this division
are, of course, rather economic than strictly legal; and the relative importance
of these two classes at any given time, therefore, depends ultimately upon the
industrial conditions which prevail a t that period.
1 B. WYMAN,supra note 19, Q 1 (emphasis added).
59. 5 F. Cas. 413 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 2575).
60. Id. at 414.
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captain of the ship was considered to have absolute and sovereign
control over the obedient will of the passenger^.^' Passengers
could not avoid the crew's abusive, insulting, immodest, or vulgar
conduct. They were forced to endure whatever indecencies the
captain in his arbitrary discretion allowed.62From Chamberlain
v. Chandlers emerged the rule for holding common carriers and,
later, innkeepers liable for uncivil treatment of their patrons.63
It is "the unusual power and opportunity afforded the carrier
[and other public utilities] to wound the feelings of those entrusted to [their] care; and the interest of the public in freedom
from insult at the hands of those with whom it must come in
contact, and on whom it must rely for essential helpv6'that necessitates a special rule applicable to public utilities. The lack of
competitive forces to regulate employee selection inspired the
common law doctrine making common carriers and other public
utilities "subject to liability to patrons utilizing [their] facilities
for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the
[utilities'] servants while otherwise acting within the scope of
their employment. "65
Money judgments serve the legitimate function of forcing
noncompetitive businesses to suffer the same pecuniary losses
competitive businesses suffer when they lose customers and profits as a result of abusive conduct. The courts in effect take the
place of competitors by applying financial pressure on noncompetitive corporations to employ persons who will serve the public in
a polite and civil manner? Competitive businesses, on the other
hand, have traditionally not been subject to liability for their
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Prosser summarized the development of the rule applied to common carriers,
innkeepers, and other businesses in the public service arena: "The basis of this special
rule is obviously the responsibility undertaken by the carrier toward the public, which
carries with it an obligation of courtesy that does not rest upon ordinary defendants."
Prosser, supra note 3, a t 60.
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF TORTS
4 48 (1965).See id. 9 48,Comment a.
66. "The chief value of the rule lies in the incentive which it provides for the selection
of employees who will not be grossly discourteous to those who must come in contact with
them, and for the making of proper rules and supervision to enforce them." Restatement
(Second) of Torts 6 48, Comment a (1965). In Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d 396
(Fla. 1958), the Supreme Court of Florida emphasized the noncompetitkenatweof businesses as the special relationship necessary to support a consumer's right to expect courtesy in business transactons. Id. a t 398. Enforcement of that right is achieved through
exposure to tort litigation via the broader path of the common law liability summarized
in 6 48.
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employees' insults and abuses as long as the actions fall short of
extreme and outrageous conduct.
The monopoly rationale for imposing liability no longer applies to all businesses expressly contemplated by section 48 of the
Restatement of Torts. For example, public transportation today
consists of many competing modes of transportation, i.e., motor
vehicles, railroads, airlines, and ships, each of which consists of
numerous companies competing for the traveling consumer. The
lodging industry is also competitive, as evidenced by vigorous
promotional campaigns designed to create impressions of hospitality, friendliness, and cordial service. Only in rare circumstances is one forced to patronize a particular carrier or stay in a
particular inn. Arguably, the competitive forces of the market
adequately deter uncivil and indecent treatment of consumers.
Rather than expand the number of businesses subject to the
higher standard of care under section 48 of the Restatement, the
historical and economic rationale for initially imposing liability
indicates that the classification should be narr~wed.~'

B. Reducing the Scope of Liability Under Section 48
Liability should be keyed to the actor's conduct rather than
a business' status as common carrier, innkeeper, or public utility.
The categorical liability imposed under section 48 should only be
relied on when there is a legitimate necessity for regulation beyond that provided by the competitive market." Emphasis on
67. Justice Holmes criticized the uniform application of a categorical notion of liability among all common carriers in The Common Law.
We do not get a new and single principle by simply giving a single name to all
the cases to be accounted for. If there is a sound rule of public policy which ought
to impose a special responsibility upon common carriers, as those words are now
understood, and upon no others, it has never yet been stated. If, on the other
hand, there are considerations which apply to a particular class among those so
designated,-for instance, to railroads, who may have a private individual at
their mercy, or exercise a power too vast for the common welfare,-we do not
prove that the reasoning extends to a general ship or a public cab by calling all
three common carriers.
0.HOLMES,
THE COMMON
LAW 161 (1963).
Professor Burdick noted the irrational continuation of the historical imposition of
unique liabilities on "common callings": "[Lliability had been repeatedly imposed upon
those classes, and so their liability for refusal to serve had become a familiar doctrine; as
so often happens, the rule came to be stated constantly without the original reasons for
it, and so the reasons were gradually forgotten." Burdick, supra note 19, at 523.
68. The law should demand a higher standard of conduct whenever a virtual monopoly exists, "otherwise in crucial instances of oppression, inconvenience, extortion and
injustice there will be no legal remedies for these industrial wrongs." Wyman, supra note
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conduct would limit recovery to those cases that involve severe
and intolerable words or actions, consistent with the public policy
of avoiding fictitious or trivial claims." ' N o pressing social need
requires that every abusive outburst be converted into a tort,"70
nor is it necessary "for the law to intervene in every case where
someone's feelings are hurt. "71
Courts should examine the relative positions of consumer
and business in each case involving public transportation, public
lodging, or any other business contemplated under section 48 to
determine whether the noncompetitive rationale underlying section 48 should apply. If the business is competitive, the court
should ignore section 48 and rely on the traditional criterion of
extreme and outrageous conduct. A fortiori, given the historical
rationale for imposing section 48 liability exclusively on public
utilities to counter their unchecked monopolistic ability to insult
and offend customers, the coverage of section 48 should not be
extended to other competitive private busine~ses.~~
Indeed, most
of the current cases allowing consumers to recover for mental
anguish caused by insults, harrassment, and offensive conduct of
private businesses ignore section 48 and rely instead on section
46 by finding such conduct "extreme and outrage~us."~
Liability
25, a t 166. "[Tlhe rule will generally hold true that the more the natural laws of competition regulate service and price, the less the State need interfere in these respects; but
conversely when competition ceases to act efficiently State control becomes necessary." 1
B. WYMAN,
supra note 19, $ 16 (emphasis added).
"The existence of a special relationship, arising . . . from the inherent nature of a
non-competitive public utility, supports a right and correlative duty of courtesy beyond
that legally required in general mercantile or personal relationships." Slocum v. Food Fair
Stores, 100 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 1958). The emphasis on noncompetitiveness implies that
those common carriers, innkeepers, and others who actually compete for customers should
be liable for emotional distress only when caused by intolerable and outrageous conduct.
69. Unless liability is made to rest in each case upon the severity of the defendant's
conduct, it would be difficult to formulate a rule permitting recovery without making the
ordinary man liable for every display of inconsideration of the feelings of others. Wallace
v. Shoreham Hotel Corp., 49 A.2d 81, 83 (D.C. 1946).
70. Magruder, supra note 4, at 1053.
(SECOND)
OF TORTS 46, Comment d (1965).
71. RESTATEMENT
72. The economic concept of social costs, borne by society in the form of disamenities,
is relevant here. The gross insults and indignities perpetrated by noncompetitive businesses are costs borne by society as a whole. When the law awards money damages the
noncompetitive tortfeasor is forced to pay the social costs of its offensiveness. Competitive
businesses, on the other hand, bear the immediate costs of their consumer abuse in lost
patronage and profits. The liability summarized in $ 48should therefore5e restn-ed
to
noncompetitive businesses. See 33 VA. L. REV. 96, 97-98 (1947).
73. See Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1972)
(defendant-insurer's coercion of plaintiff to settle "clearly rises to the level of 'outrageous
conduct' to a person of 'ordinary sensibilities' "); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911,918-
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should be predicated on the intolerable conduct of a tortfeasor
under the standard set forth in section 46 rather than by classifying the tortfeasor as a business subject to liability under section
48.
Justice Holmes criticized the continuation of a categorical
imposition of liability.
If there is no common rule of policy, and common carriers
[innkeepers and other public utilities] remain a merely empirical exception from general doctrine, courts may well hesitate to
extend significance of those words. . . . Hence it may perhaps
be concluded that, if any new case should arise, the degree of
responsibility . . . should stand open to argument on general
principles. 74

The general principles upon which recovery should be based are
clearly those articulated in section 46 of the Restatement of Torts.

C. Section 46 as the Basis for Liability
Several recent cases strengthen the argument for avoiding an
extension of liability under section 48 and instead relying on a
simplified tort theory grounded on section 46. Courts have with
increasing willingness awarded damages for mental anguish suffered by insured parties as the result of extreme settlement tactics of insurers.15Often courts couch grounds for recovery in terms
of extreme and outrageous conduct, relying on two general factors
identified by both Dean Prosser and the Re~tatement.'~
First, courts consider the position or relationship of the parties to evaluate the defendant's relative power to wound the
plaintiff's feelings or emotions.77Second, courts examine the de19 (Iowa 1976) (defendant-mortician's dishonest and uncivil treatment of a customer
whose deceased father and stepmother were being prepared by defendant for burial was
declared outrageous); Note, Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company: A Trend
Toward Strict Liability for Emotional Distress in the Insurance Industry, 12 CAL.W.L.
REV.591, 601-02 (1976).
74. 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON
LAW 161-62 (1963).
75. See World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Note,
Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments In the Law of
Torts and Contract, 48 N m DM LAW.1303, 1306 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Recent
Developments].
76. Recent Developments, supra note 75, at 1306.
77. "The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse
by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
authority over the other, or power to affect his interests." RESTATEMENT
§ 46, Comment e (1965). See Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th
Cir. 1972).

94

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

fendant's awareness of any mental or physical condition of the
plaintiff that may make him susceptible to emotional distress."
Either abuse of the seller's position of authority or intentional
and flagrant conduct in the face of known susceptibility to emotional distress constitutes outrageous conduct. In insurance cases,
tort actions for emotional distress arising from the insurer's unfair
or abusive settlement tactics is based on the insurer-beneficiary
relationship, which places the insurer in an unequal position of
power.'@ Furthermore, when an insurer realizes a beneficiary's
peculiar susceptibility to emotional injury resulting from his reliance on insurance proceeds to ameliorate the loss of life or property, the insurer has an implied duty to treat the beneficiary with
a higher degree of fairness and civility.80
Several cases involving typical consumer transactions join
the insurance cases as examples of this approach to recovery for
emotional distress in consumer transactions. In Lemaldi v. De
the plaintiff purchased a new Pantera
Tomaso of America,
automobile, which turned out to be a "lemon."82 The plaintiff
attempted many times to have the defects rectified but was repeatedly evaded, misled, and dissatisfied by the defendant car
dealer,83whose action and inaction ultimately left the car inoperable." The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that under the
78. According to the Restatement reporters:
Conduct may be characterized as extreme and outrageous when it arises
from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to thi? emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity.
The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor
proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not
know.
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS§ 46, Comment f (1965). See Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972).
79. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972). See Recent
Developments, supra note 75, a t 1307-08.
80."[I]t is common knowledge that one of the most frequent considerations in procuring life insurance is to ensure the continued economic and mental welfare of the
beneficiaries upon the death of the insured." Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470
F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972).
81. 156 N.J. Super. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (1978).
82. Id. at 447, 383 A.2d at 1223. The car's air conditioner fell out on the street, the
car constantly pulled to the right, the windshield leaked, and the bushings burned out.
The clutch, radiator, windshield wipers, and transmission all malfunctioned, requiring the
car to be continually in the shop during the first year of ownership. Id. at446, 383 A2d
at 1222.
83. The car dealer and personnel "failed to take or advise him of corrective action or
to honor his claims." Id. at 447, 383 A.2d at 1223.
84. The court summed up the pitiful ending to an exasperating experience: "The
Pantera, beautiful but unusable, now rests in state in a carpeted garage which, plaintiff
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already exasperating circumstances surrounding the defective
car, the dealer's conduct "would aggravate an ordinary man to
the point of 'mental anguish.' "" The defendant's duty toward
the plaintiff was "largely grounded in the natural responsibilities
of social living and human relations, such as have the recognition
of reasonable men; fulfillment is had by a correlative standard of
conduct ."g6
The court did not articulate its holding in terms of outrageous conduct under section 46. It referred instead to a "social
duty" on the car dealer's part to avoid offensive and abusive
conduct in light of circumstances surrounding this particular
transaction. The court did not rely on traditional justifications of
implied contract or warranty, or on an assignment of a higher
duty of care by analogy to public utility status. Thus, although
this case characterizes a growing trend to grant relief for
independent emotional distress suffered in private business
transactions, the decision was not based on a concrete theory.
The court could have achieved the same result based on either of
the two factors in the comments to section 46, which would have
facilitated a finding of outrageous conduct. The plaintiff in
Lemaldi was arguably in a much weaker bargaining position than
the car dealer since his car was a unique and expensive piece of
machinery that only a competent and experienced dealership
should attempt to repair. This unequal position of power elevates
the dealer's duty to avoid offensive treatment of the plaintiff, the
breach of which could be characterized as outrageous. Alternatively, the car dealer may still have been liable if he had knowledge of some physicial or mental condition that made the plaintiff particularly susceptible to emotional distress. The defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's unusual emotional interest in
the purchase of the new Panterag7would have created circumstances under which defendant's offensive conduct would justify
a finding of outrageousness and permit recovery under section 46.
In Wilson u. Redken Laboratories, I n q g gthe plaintiff recovered a large money judgment from a hair products manufacturer whose chemical treatment for hair discoloration ultimately
resulted in the plaintiff's baldness. The court held that notwithstanding the absence of physical pain or injury, the plaintiff
testified, looks 'better than his room.' " Id. at 446, 383 A.2d at 1223.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The plaintiff purchased the car on his birthday and kept it in a carpeted garage.
88. 562 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1978).
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should be compensated for the humiliation and embarrassment
she experienced as a result of losing her hair? The court made
no finding of extreme and outrageous conduct, although the result of the defendant's negligence could indeed be characterized
as outrageous. In Wilson the Supreme Court of Kentucky was
apparently convinced that the emotional interest in the service
purchased by the plaintiff was intimately associated with the
defendant's satisfactory performance of the services.90Liability
for emotional injury could easily have rested on the defendant's
abuse of its unique power to wound the plaintiff's emotions or its
negligent conduct in the face of the plaintiff's known susceptibility to emotional distress in the event her hair were discolored or
lost. Either of these findings would constitute outrageousness and
provide a clearer, more manageable basis for imposing liability.
In Hanke v. Global Van Lines, Incgl the plaintiff suffered
great anxiety and disappointment when the moving company
repeatedly failed to deliver her personal belongings on promised
dates? The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the
summary judgment ordered by the lower court for the defendant
and held that the defendant's practices in this case could amount
to outrageous conduct.g3The defendant's position of power, and
ability to wound the feelings of the plaintiff by continually
"stringing her along" with meaningless promises of delivery,
could conceivably convert the unfair, unsettling, and irritating
business practices into outrageous conduct.
These cases illustrate the trend of providing consumers relief
from insulting and abusive practices. In order to prevent frivolous
claims, the chief criterion for relief should be outrageous conduct
gauged by considerations of the business' relative power to wound
the customer's emotions and the customer's known susceptibility
to emotional injury. In transactions involving a violation of legitimate emotional concern that is sufficiently grievious to warrant
judicial relief, the plaintiff should rely on these two factors for
determining outrageous behavior.
89. Id. at 636-37.
90. "One of the greatest pains that any person can suffer is the pain of embarrassment. The sudden loss of Louise's hair was a traumatic shock." Id. at 636.
91. 533 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976).
92. The plaintiff was repeatedly informed by telegramthatshe could-expect cteiivery
of her furniture on specific dates, which came and went without delivery. After complaining to the Interstate Commerce Commission, she was again assured that she would receive
delivery on a given date. Again the shipment failed to arrive as promised. Id. at 398.
93. Id. at 400.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As courts continue to expand their recognition of the individual's right of freedom from emotional and mental abuse, consumers are likely to occupy an increasing number of seats a t plaintiff
tables seeking recovery for emotional distress inflicted by businesses and their employees." Insults and abuses that are so atrocious and beyond the bounds of decency as to elicit the exclamation "Outrageous! "95 are clearly actionable under section 46 of
the Restatement of Torts. Offensive speech'or conduct of common
carriers, innkeepers, or other public utilities is currently actionable absent outrageous conduct by virtue of the common law, summarized in section 48 of the Restatement. For consistency with
the historical rationale underlying the common law expressed in
section 48, courts should not impose liability for less than outrageous conduct unless a compelling public interest to regulate a
noncompetitive business exists.
A difficult situation arises when a private business inflicts
emotional distress by insulting a customer or engaging in harsh
business practices that cannot be characterized as extreme and
outrageous under the traditional meaning of section 46. Legal
scholars have contemplated the possibility of imposing on private
businesses the same duty now possessed by public utilities, to
avoid insulting or undignified service. This proposition should be
rejected in light of the historical and economic rationale for initially imposing liability exclusively on public utilities. The thrust
of section 48 liability for inflicting emotional distress is consistent
with the public need for general regulation of public utilties. Both
the imposition of a higher standard of care under the common law
and modem legislative regulation of public utilities respond to
the noncompetitive nature of such businesses and the lack of
effective consumer control through market forces. Because private businesses are subject to the forces of the competitive market system and are already sensitive to the loss of consumer support resulting from dissatisfactory conduct and services, they
should not be subject to the same judicial supervision through
tort litigaton necessary in the case of noncompetitive public utilities.
94. "[Clonsidering the greater strain that has been placed on one's nervous system
under modem conditions of high speed living, and in accordance with the current standards of propriety, good taste and decency," the judiciary is willing to,find intrusions into
the emotional aspects of life "actionable over a constantly widening area." Borda, supra
note 1, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
95. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF TORTS
§ 46, Comment d (1965).
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A logical method of redressing legitimate emotional injuries
inflicted by private businesses on their customers is to expand the
concept of outrageous conduct to encompass particularly offensive business practices. Under this theory, an abuse of a business'
special position of power over the feelings of a customer, or the
business' flagrant offensiveness toward a customer while fully
aware of the customer's susceptibility to emotional distress, could
be characterized as "outrageous" and actionable under the common law summarized in section 46. Only when a business has
abused a unique position of power or has acted offensively in the
face of a known susceptibility to emotional distress should the
business' conduct be characterized as outrageous and intolerable.
There are specific instances when customers suffer emotional distress as a result of offensive business practices. Recovery, however, should not become a function of extended public utility
liability under section 48 of the Restatement of Torts but should
be based in each case on conduct that, because of the particular
business relationship of the parties, rises to an intolerable level
of offensiveness.
Val John Christensen

